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Non-technical summary
While the German wage structure has long been considered relatively stable at
lower percentiles, the past two decades have seen a clear tendency towards more
earnings inequality at the bottom end of the earnings distribution as well as decli-
ning wage mobility. As a consequence, the low-wage sector has increasingly grown
in importance.
Two competing explanations may be relevant for the observed phenomenon.
On the one hand, a larger degree of persistence in terms of “true”or “genuine”state
dependence of low-wage employment may exist, which occurs if low-wage employ-
ment today causes low-wage employment in the future for reasons of stigmatization
or human capital depreciation. Alternatively, a larger degree of persistence may be
the result of a more unfavorable composition of the low-wage sector. The overall
aim of our analysis is therefore to explore to what extent the observed decline
in (West) German low-wage mobility reflects a rise in “true”state dependence by
distinguishing the evolution of genuine state dependence from pure composition
effects. We do so for the years 1984 to 2004 by using the administrative data set
of the IAB Employment Subsample (IABS) which is a two per cent subsample of
the German Employment Statistics Register.
The descriptive statistics confirm the common trend of an increasing low-wage
sector in Germany since the mid-1990s. With respect to the degree of low-wage
persistence, we find a distinct increase in the share of individuals staying in the
low-wage sector. We see, however, that part of this increase is due to a large shift
of compositional factors. The proportion of young male low paid workers, e.g., who
face a much smaller risk of sticking to a low wage than older employees, fell from
52% in 1984 to 24% in 2002. This illustrates the necessity to econometrically filter
out the compositional factors by taking into account all observable characteristics
that affect the extent of true state dependence.
To obtain a measure of genuine state dependence, we make use of a trivariate
probit model that accounts for the selection into low-wage employment and ear-
nings retention. Our analysis shows that the extent of genuine state dependence
among low-paid workers has increased most notably between 1987 and 1995. The
results of a decomposition analysis illustrate that up to 54 per cent of the increase
in genuine state dependence during the 1990s can be attributed to compositional
shifts towards more unfavorable observable characteristics among the low paid.
Our results therefore lend strong support to the notion that appropriate policy
interventions should aim at working against such compositional shifts by, e.g.,
improving low-wage earners’ skills and intensifying older low paid employees’ vo-
cational training opportunities.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Angesichts steigender Lohnungleichheit am unteren Ende der Lohnverteilung hat
der Niedriglohnsektor in Deutschland erheblich an Bedeutung gewonnen. Gleich-
zeitig la¨sst sich eine Zunahme der Persistenz einer Bescha¨ftigung im Niedriglohn-
sektor beobachten. Die Ursachen fu¨r diese sinkende Aufwa¨rtsmobilita¨t sind indes
noch ungekla¨rt.
Fu¨r die abnehmende Aufwa¨rtsmobilita¨t gibt es unterschiedliche Erkla¨rungs-
ansa¨tze: Eine mo¨gliche Ursache liegt in der Zunahme “echter”Persistenz im Sinne
genuiner Zustandsabha¨ngigkeit. “Echte”Persistenz bildet den kausalen Effekt einer
Niedriglohnbescha¨ftigung ab und beschreibt somit, inwieweit allein der Umstand,
sich bereits im Niedriglohnsektor zu befinden, einen weiteren Aufstieg behindert.
Als Gru¨nde hierfu¨r sind beispielsweise etwaige Stigmatisierungseffekte und mo¨gli-
che Humankapitalentwertungen zu nennen. Eine alternative Erkla¨rung fu¨r die sin-
kenden Aufstiegschancen liegt in einer ungu¨nstigeren Zusammensetzung des Nied-
riglohnsektors. Diese ist mo¨glicherweise von Relevanz, da die Aufstiegschancen
maßgeblich durch individuelle Eigenschaften wie das Alter oder den Bildungsstand
bestimmt werden und sich die Zusammensetzung des Niedriglohnsektors hinsicht-
lich dieser Merkmale vera¨ndert hat. Ziel der vorliegenden Studie ist es daher,
die Bedeutung beider Erkla¨rungsansa¨tze mithilfe der IAB-Bescha¨ftigtenstichpro-
be (IABS) fu¨r den Zeitraum 1984 bis 2004 in Westdeutschland zu quantifizieren.
Deskriptive Berechnungen zeigen, dass die Persistenz einer Niedriglohnbescha¨fti-
gung u¨ber den betrachteten Zeitraum einen deutlich steigenden Trend aufweist.
Dabei haben z.B. a¨ltere Altersgruppen ein weitaus ho¨heres Risiko, im Niedrig-
lohnsektor bescha¨ftigt zu bleiben, als ju¨ngere. Gleichzeitig ist zu beobachten, dass
der Anteil ju¨ngerer Bescha¨ftigter im Niedriglohnsektor zwischen 1984 und 1999 er-
heblich abgenommen hat. Wa¨hrend 1984 gut jeder zweite ma¨nnliche Bescha¨ftigte
im Niedriglohnsektor unter 26 war, so war es 1999 nur noch knapp jeder vierte.
Diese Entwicklung verdeutlicht, dass die vera¨nderte Alterskomposition des Nied-
riglohnsektors einen mo¨glichen Erkla¨rungsansatz fu¨r den zunehmenden Verbleib
im Niedriglohnsektor bietet.
Mithilfe eines trivariaten Probit-Modells la¨sst sich die echte Persistenz ermit-
teln, die alle beobachtbaren Charakteristika der Individuen beru¨cksichtigt. Unsere
Analyse zeigt, dass die durchschnittliche echte Persistenz vor allem im Zeitraum
von 1987 bis 1995 deutlich zugenommen hat. Die Ergebnisse einer Dekompositions-
analyse zeigen daru¨ber hinaus, dass bis zu 54 v.H. des Anstiegs der echten Persi-
stenz fu¨r im Niedriglohnsektor Bescha¨ftigte in den 90er Jahren auf Vera¨nderungen
in der Komposition des Niedriglohnsektors zuru¨ckzufu¨hren sind. Dies impliziert,
dass mo¨gliche Politikmaßnahmen unter anderem auf die Fo¨rderung verbesserter
Qualifikationen der Bescha¨ftigten sowie vor allem die Weiterbildung a¨lterer Ar-
beitnehmer/innen im Niedriglohnsektor abzielen sollten.
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Abstract
In this paper, we study how wage mobility in the low-wage sector has changed
in western Germany between 1984 and 2004. Using German individual register
data, we document a clear upward trend in the persistence of low-wage employment
for both men and women. Next to compositional shifts of the low-wage sector
relative to the high-wage sector, this trend may be explained by an increase in
“genuine”state dependence, which occurs if low-wage employment today causes low-
wage employment in the future for reasons of, e.g., stigmatization or human capital
depreciation. To isolate the latter, we model low-pay transitions by estimating
a series of multivariate probit models. We address the initial conditions problem
and the endogeneity of earnings attrition in our estimation approach by accounting
for the selection into low-wage employment and earnings retention. Our findings
for men and women point to an upward trend of genuine state dependence among
low paid workers especially since the beginning of the 1990s. Using decomposition
techniques, we show that between 35 and 54 per cent of the increase in genuine
state dependence during the 1990s is accounted for by compositional effects.
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1 Introduction
A large body of academic work has documented a sharp increase in earnings inequality
particularly in the Anglo-Saxon countries over the last three decades (e.g. Acemoglu
2003, Gosling et al. 2000, Levy and Murnane 1992). However, as long as individuals
are able to move up the earnings distribution, a high degree of cross-sectional earnings
inequality is likely to exaggerate the extent of inequality over a working life. Thus, any
analysis of the evolution of lifetime inequality requires investigating the evolution of both
inequality and mobility. For example, a rise in wage mobility could mitigate an increase
in cross-sectional earnings inequality because, in that case, a position at the bottom of
the distribution would be of more temporary nature. Conversely, if a rise in earnings
inequality were accompanied by a decline in mobility, inequality over a working lifetime
would increase due to more persistent positions in the earnings distribution.
Even though there is a large literature that addresses both the evolution of inequality
and mobility over time (e.g., Cardoso 2006, Dickens 2000, Gottschalk 1997, Kopczuk et al.
2010), little is known about the determinants underlying the evolution of wage mobility.
This is particularly relevant as a number of authors has documented a widening in the
distribution of labor earnings that is accompanied by a decline in mobility, giving rise to a
larger persistence of low-wage employment (see Buchinsky and Hunt (1999) for the U.S.,
Cardoso (2006) for Portugal and Dickens (2000) for the U.K.). From a welfare perspective,
a high degree of low-pay persistence is of particular concern as it tends to marginalize low-
wage workers in the long run. As a result, the determinants of low-pay persistence are of
considerable interest to policy-makers. For instance, a decline in low-wage mobility that
is accounted for by an increase in the fraction of those without educational attainment
would call for appropriate policy interventions aiming at improving these characteristics.
In contrast, if a decline in low-wage mobility was caused by increasing state dependence
due to stigmatization effects, policy measures aiming at improving observable attributes
of low-wage workers would be less likely to succeed.
The purpose of the present paper is therefore to fill this gap and to investigate the
determinants of the evolution of wage mobility. Using German administrative data, we
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focus on the western German low-wage sector, which is particularly interesting for several
reasons. First, while the German wage structure has long been considered relatively stable
at lower percentiles (Prasad 2004), the past two decades have seen a clear tendency to-
wards more earnings inequality at the bottom end of the earnings distribution (Dustmann
et al. 2009, Kohn 2006). As a consequence, the low-wage sector has increasingly grown in
importance. Second, there is evidence that wage mobility has been declining over the last
decades (see Gernandt 2009 and Riphahn and Schnitzlein 2011). However, as mentioned
above, this does not necessarily imply a larger degree of persistence in terms of “true”or
“genuine”state dependence of low-wage employment, which may occur if low-wage em-
ployment today causes low-wage employment in the future for reasons of stigmatization
or human capital depreciation.1 Alternatively, a larger degree of persistence may also be
the result of a more unfavorable composition of the low-wage sector. The large extent of
selection into low-wage employment has been documented by a number of studies dealing
with the determinants of wage mobility. A key finding that emerges from this literature
is that the extent of genuine state dependence is often considerably reduced once observ-
able attributes and selection into low-wage employment are accounted for (see Cappellari
2002, 2007, Stewart and Swaffield 1999). The overall aim of our analysis is therefore to
explore to what extent the observed decline in German low-wage mobility reflects a rise in
“true”state dependence by distinguishing the evolution of genuine state dependence from
pure composition effects.
The data we use to address these questions stem from the IAB Employment Subsample
1975-2004 (IABS). This administrative data set is a two per cent subsample of the German
Employment Statistics Register, which is based on reports from employers in compliance
with the notifying procedure for the German social security system. The Employment
Statistics Register offers information on individual wage records and a number of individ-
ual characteristics for the whole population of employees who are covered by the German
social security system. The IABS provides a useful basis for exploring the evolution of
the determinants of wage mobility for several reasons. First, the data allow us to retrieve
1Using German household data from the GSOEP, Uhlendorff (2006) finds evidence for true state
dependence of low-pay jobs. In contrast to Uhlendorff (2006), who looks at pooled transitions over the
observation period 1998 to 2003, we focus on the evolution of true state dependence over time.
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a great deal of reliable information on workers’ previous employment histories, which will
be used to model the selection of individuals into the low-wage sector. Second, due to the
administrative nature of the IABS, the problem of panel attrition is considerably reduced
as the data track individuals over time as long as they are either employed or, alter-
natively, unemployed with transfer payments. Even though our data feature less panel
attrition than survey data, we still face the problem of non-random earnings retention
as individuals may become voluntarily or involuntarily unemployed and may fall out of
the earnings distribution. Because this dropout is likely to be non-random, we follow the
approach of Cappellari and Jenkins (2006) and Cappellari (2007) by estimating a series
of trivariate probit models, which not only account for the selection into low-wage em-
ployment, but additionally model non-random earnings retention. To do so, we will take
advantage of the precise information on workers’ employment histories in order to find
appropriate exclusion restrictions that govern both the process of earnings retention and
the initial conditions process.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a description of
the data and some descriptive results. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis. While
Sections 3.1. and 3.2. spell out the estimation strategy and define the measure of state
dependence, Section 3.3. presents the empirical results. The final Section 4 concludes.
2 Descriptive Empirical Analysis
2.1 Data and Variable Description
The data for our analysis are taken from the regional file of the IAB employment subsam-
ple 1975-2004 (IABS ). This administrative data set, which is described in more detail by
Drews (2008), contains a 2 per cent random sample of all social security records spanning
the time period 1975 to 2004. It includes employment records subject to social secu-
rity contributions as well as unemployment records with transfer receipt. The data is
representative of all workers subject to the German social security system and covers ap-
proximately 80 per cent of the German workforce. Self-employed workers, civil servants
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and individuals currently doing their military service are not included in the data set.
We restrict our analysis to western Germany as eastern Germany experienced profound
political and structural changes during our observation period. We further restrict our
sample to individuals aged 20 to 55 and confine our analysis to the years 1984 to 2004
due to a structural break concerning the wage information which took place in 1984. The
IABS provides individual information on (daily) wage records, workers’ employment his-
tories and a number of individual characteristics such as age, education, nationality and
occupational status. Since the data set is comprised out of spell data, the data allow us
to retrieve a large number of variables used to proxy the stability of workers’ employment
histories. In particular, the data allow us to measure tenure at the current employer, the
number of previous un- and non-employment spells, the number of previous employers,
the number of employment interruptions at the current employer as well as the cumula-
tive duration of previous un- and non-employment spells. A full description as well as
descriptive statistics of the variables used in our analysis can be found in Tables B1 and
B2 in the Appendix.
Although the IABS provides a great deal of information on workers’ employment histo-
ries, the data set has some disadvantages as well. First, the data set provides information
on daily wages. While we observe an individual’s full-time or part-time status (defined as
working less than 30 hours per week), the data lack explicit information on the number
of hours worked. For this reason, we restrict our sample to full-time workers. Second,
the data do not allow a distinction between involuntarily unemployed individuals without
transfer receipt and individuals who left the labor force or who became self-employed or
civil servants. To distinguish more precisely between voluntary and involuntary unem-
ployment, we follow the assumptions proposed by Lee and Wilke (2009) about when the
state of unemployment is reached. Further information on the definition of un- and non-
employment spells as well as on adjustments of the wage and the education information
can be found in Appendix B.
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2.2 Definition of Low-Pay Status
To study the evolution of wages in the low-wage sector, we define the low-pay status as
earning less than two thirds of the median (full-time) wage. This definition has been
used in several other studies (e.g. OECD 1998, Stewart and Swaffield 1999 and European
Commission 2004). In order to calculate the low-pay threshold for each year, we consider
only spells which include the set date June 30th.2 For each year of our observation period,
we start from the population of full-time employed workers for whom we define the low-
pay status and the respective pay and employment status five years later. This gives
rise to 16 relevant transition periods (1984/1989, 1985/1990, . . . , 1999/2004). The low-
or high-pay status is only defined for those who stay full-time employed five years later.
We therefore construct a dummy measuring full-time earnings retention, which takes on
the value of zero if individuals fall out of the full-time earnings distribution (i.e. become
part-time employed, apprentices, involuntarily unemployed or non-employed).
2.3 The Evolution and Pattern of Low-Pay Transitions
In line with the definition of Section 2.2, Figure 1 displays the fraction of low paid indi-
viduals among all full-time employees for the years 1984 to 2002. The figure shows that
the extent of the low-wage sector was quite stable in Germany until the mid nineties with
a slightly decreasing trend until 1996. After that, the low-wage sector experienced a clear
upward trend: in 2002, the rate of low-wage earners was 14.9 per cent, 14 per cent higher
than in 1996.3 As shown in Figure 2, the overall increase was fully made-up by male
workers. Among them, the share of low paid workers, which was in the range of 5 to 6
per cent between 1984 and 1996, increased to 8 per cent in 2002. In contrast, the share
of low paid women dropped from 33 per cent in 1985 to 28 per cent in 2002. Obviously,
however, female workers still exhibit a much higher probability of being low paid than
male workers. Compared with workers from the high-wage sector, low paid individuals
2Note, however, that we exploit the full spell structure of the data to construct information on indi-
viduals’ employment histories. Weighting the wage information by the length of the spell did not alter
the results substantially.
3This development confirms earlier results by Rhein et al. (2005), who find a very similar evolution of
low-wage employment using the same data set for the years between 1990 and 2001. Bosch and Kalina
(2007), also using the same data set, yield similar results, though at a slightly higher low-wage level.
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are on average four years younger, less well educated and are more likely to be of foreign
nationality (see Table B2 in the Appendix). Also, as one would expect, total previous un-
and non-employment duration periods have on average been longer for individuals in the
low-wage sector, whereas their job tenure is on average shorter than that for individuals
working in the high-wage sector.
Figure 1: Share of low-wage earners in the total population, 1984 - 2002
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In order to describe the overall pattern of the evolution of low-wage persistence, we
calculate a measure of aggregate state dependence (ASD) for each year. This mea-
sure is defined as the difference between the probability of staying in the low-wage sec-
tor and the probability of entering the low-wage sector five years later, i.e. ASD =
Pr (Lt = 1|Lt−5 = 1)− Pr (Lt = 1|Lt−5 = 0). Note that this measure does not account for
the heterogeneity across formerly low and high paid workers. Later in our analysis, we will
therefore attempt to distinguish this measure from the degree of genuine state persistence
(GSD). This is the measure of “true”persistence we are ultimately interested in and will
be defined as the difference in transition probabilities conditional on being initially low
and high paid, respectively, therefore providing a measure of differences in price effects of
observables across the two groups (see Section 3.2).
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Figure 2: Share of low-wage earners in the total population by sex, 1984 - 2002
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Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of ASD between 1984 and 1999 for males and females.
As the probability of entering the low-wage sector is typically close to zero, the extent
of ASD is mainly determined by the persistence probability. In 1984, for example, the
overall persistence probability was 50 per cent, i.e. one out of two individuals who earned
a low wage and still worked five years later kept his or her low-pay status. The probability
of moving from high to low pay, however, was very small in 1984, with only every 20th
woman and approximately every 100th man entering the low-wage sector. Figure 3 reveals
that the level of ASD is about 20 percentage points higher for women than for men. This
means that men are considerably less likely to stick to a low-wage job. The development
of ASD was quite similar for both sexes, though. Women experienced a larger decrease in
ASD in the mid 1980s than men, with both sexes reaching their lowest value in the year
1987 with an ASD of 26 per cent for males and an ASD of 49 per cent for females. Since
1987, ASD has been rising continuously with only a slight attenuation period during the
mid 1990s. In 1999, the male ASD amounted to 45 per cent, whereas women faced an
ASD of 65 per cent. Thus, (western) Germany has experienced a distinct shift towards a
higher degree of low-wage persistence in the last 15 years of the 20th century.
What determines the extent of ASD? Turning to the association between low-pay
persistence and observable attributes, Figure 4 provides the evolution of ASD by different
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Figure 3: Aggregate state dependence by sex, 1984 - 1999
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age groups.4 The figure illustrates that there are remarkable differences across groups,
with younger and less experienced workers exhibiting considerable less ASD than older
and more experienced workers. While the difference between the probabilities of remaining
low paid and entering low pay was 29 per cent for workers under the age of 25 in 1984,
workers older than 50 years faced a much higher ASD (78 per cent). By 1999, this
difference had only slightly decreased. However, the share of old workers in the low-wage
sector is by far smaller than the share of young workers below 26 years (see Figure 5).
Averaged over the whole observation period, only 3 (27) per cent of male (female) workers
above 50 years earned a low wage, whereas 18 (41) per cent of the young workers below
26 years were low paid. In other words, younger workers have a higher probability of
earning a low wage but are, at the same time, more likely to move up the wage ladder.
Once, however, older workers face a low-wage job, it is much harder for them to escape
the low-wage sector. Note that this is consistent with the concave shape of age-earnings
profiles typically reported in the literature (see e.g. Murphy and Welch, 1990).5 With
respect to an individual’s tenure, the interpretation works similar (see Figure A1 in the
Appendix). The shorter the tenure at the current job is, the higher is the likelihood of
earning a low wage (Figure A2) and - on the other hand - the lower will be the extent of
4For illustration purposes, figures regarding the age variable are shown in the main text. All remaining
figures can be found in Appendix A.
5For Germany, recent evidence on age-earnings profiles is provided by Bo¨nke et al. (2011).
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ASD.
The level of education is also clearly related to the degree of state dependence: the
better an individual is educated the lower is his or her ASD. Figure A3 reveals for both
sexes that while the ASD for the high and low-skilled increased only very slightly over
our observation period, medium-skilled workers experienced a much larger increase in
their ASD.6 Interestingly, the ASD level of medium-skilled workers has converged to
the ASD level of the low-skilled - a development which can be observed for men as well
as for women. Put differently, medium-skilled workers, once earning a low wage, seemed
to face about the same risk of being caught in the low-wage sector as their low-skilled
counterparts in 1999. As Figure A4 points out, however, the share of medium-skilled
men (women) is with 5 (28) per cent substantially lower than the share of low-skilled
individuals in the low-wage sector (13 per cent for men, 38 per cent for women).
Figure 4: Aggregate state dependence by age group, 1984 - 1999
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There are further observable characteristics that are associated with different levels of
ASD. With respect to nationality, for example, Figure A5 reveals that foreign individuals
have long faced a larger risk of sticking to a low-wage job. By the end of the observation
period in 1999, however, the ASD for workers of German nationality had converged to
the level of their foreign counterparts for both males and females. Such a convergence can
6The spikes in the ASD of high-skilled low paid males can be explained by the small number of
observations (<100 per year).
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not be found when comparing the development of ASD of blue- and white-collar workers
(see Figure A6). Over the whole observation period, the ASD of blue-collar workers has
remained about 10 percentage points higher than the ASD of white-collar workers. This
pattern holds for male as well as for female workers.
Figure 5: Mean share of low-wage earners by age group and sex, 1984 - 2002
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Why did the overall aggregate state dependence increase over time? Besides factors
like business cycle effects or other macroeconomic developments, one possible explanation
could be a change in the composition of the low-wage sector that caused the extent of
ASD to rise. To investigate such possible composition effects, it is instructive to depict
the evolution of some selected observable attributes in the low-wage sector relative to
the respective development in the high-wage sector. As can be seen from Figure 6 for
males and Figure 7 for females, the share of young workers below the age of 26 among
the low paid decreased markedly during the last decades. While the proportion of young
female workers in the low-wage sector dropped from 40 per cent to 19 per cent over the
observation period, the decrease was even larger for male workers below the age of 26. For
the latter, the corresponding share fell from 52 per cent in 1984 to 24 per cent in 2002.
This is a much more pronounced decline compared to the development in the high-wage
population where the share of young male (female) workers dropped from 13 to 6 (24
to 10) per cent between 1984 and 2002.7 Not only the demographic change drives this
7The figures of the age and tenure evolution of the high-wage sector are available from the authors
upon request.
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development. The decision to acquire higher education was taken more often in Germany
in 2000 (34 per cent) than in 1985 (20 per cent) so that a smaller share of workers was
available for the labor market below the age of 26 (Federal Statistical Office, 2011).8 As
a consequence, the sharp decline in the share of young workers among the low paid, who
- as seen above - face a lower ASD than the older workforce may have contributed to the
overall observed increase in ASD over time.
The development of other observed characteristics, however, works against an increase
in ASD over the observation period. The sex composition in the low-wage sector, for
example, has shifted distinctly towards more men being low paid. While the share of
males in the high paid population remained roughly constant within the range of 71 to
74 per cent, the share of male workers among the low paid has steadily risen from 21 per
cent in 1984 to 36 per cent in 2002, see Figure A7. Since male workers, on average, face a
lower ASD than female workers (compare Figure 3), this change in the sex composition
of the low-wage sector has favored a reduction of the overall ASD over time.9
Figure 6: Evolution of the age composition in the low-wage sector 1984 - 2002, men
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8Following the definition of the OECD publication “Education at a Glance”, the numbers of the
Statistical Office are calculated by dividing the absolute number of first-year students by the population
of individuals in the typical age range. The number for the year 2000 including the states of eastern
Germany.
9However, in what follows, we will analyze the evolution of state dependence for men and women
separately.
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One explanation for the improving situation of women might relate to the decline
in the share of low-skilled workers in the female workforce between 1984 and 2002, as
can be seen from Figure A8. However, compared to the development in the high-wage
sector where the fraction of the low-skilled decreased from 24 to 10 per cent, low paid
females experienced a weaker decline in the fraction of low-skilled workers (from 29 to
21 per cent). Male low paid workers exhibit an even less favorable evolution in their
skill composition: while in the high-wage sector the fraction of male low-skilled workers
declined from 17 to 10 per cent, the corresponding share in the low-wage sector even rose
by six percentage points (from 27 to 33 per cent, see Figure A9). Moreover, the low-wage
sector experienced a less pronounced increase in the share of high-skilled workers than
the high-wage sector, where the fraction of high-skilled doubled between 1984 and 2002.
Overall, the less favorable evolution of the skill composition among low paid workers
should have contributed to a rise in ASD. However, as medium-skilled workers have
steadily approached the ASD level of their low-skilled counterparts over time (compare
Figure A3), this price effect is likely to have mitigated the effect of the skill composition
on ASD over time.
There are further developments that support a compositional explanation of the rise in
ASD over time. As a consequence of the ongoing technological change and the associated
structural shift from production to service industries, the share of blue-collar workers
(as compared to white-collar workers) declined by about ten percentage points in the
high-wage population for both sexes between 1984 and 2002 (see Figure A10). While a
reduction in the share of blue-collar workers is also observed for low paid women during
the observation period, the opposite is true for male workers in the low-wage sector.
Despite the overall decreasing importance of blue-collar jobs, the fraction of blue-collar
workers among the low paid increased between 1984 and 2002. As blue-collar workers are
more likely to remain low paid (the ASD is - as shown by Figure A6 - ten percentage
points higher than for white-collar workers), the male-specific shift towards more low paid
blue-collar jobs is likely to have contributed to the rise in ASD.
With respect to nationality patterns, Figure A11 illustrates that particularly the low-
wage sector has experienced volatile movements over time. While the share of foreign
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Figure 7: Evolution of the age composition in the low-wage sector 1984 - 2002, women
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workers in the male high-wage population remained quite stable between 1984 and 1995
(9 to 10 per cent), this fraction more than doubled from 13 to 28 per cent in the male
low-wage sector. This development, which - albeit to a somewhat lesser extent - is also
observed for females, reflects the rise in migration flows especially into the low-wage
sector after the fall of communism and the opening of the Iron Curtain (e.g., Bauer
and Zimmermann 1999). By 2002, the share of foreigners among low paid male workers
declined back to 20 per cent. As foreign workers faced a higher risk of remaining low
paid at the beginning of the observation period, these developments may have fostered an
increase in ASD until the mid-nineties and a slight decrease afterwards. For an overview,
Table B3 in the Appendix summarizes the development of the composition of the low-wage
sector for males and females by selected characteristics for the years 1984 and 2002.
Taken together, the descriptions shown above provide clear evidence of an increasing
degree of persistence in the low-wage sector. Moreover, the degree (and the evolution) of
persistence varies considerably across observable attributes. It remains, however, unclear
whether the increasing persistence can be fully attributed to a compositional shift towards
more unfavorable observable characteristics. In addition to the observed developments
fostering a rise in low-wage persistence, such as the increasing fraction of older workers
and the less favorable skill composition among the low paid, a low-wage job per se might
have increasingly caused low-wage employment in the future, regardless of the evolution
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of observable attributes. Such a development could stem from an increase in “true”or
genuine state-dependence. The question of to what extent the observed increase in ASD is
accounted for by a less favorable composition of low-wage workers or an increase in genuine
state dependence will therefore be addressed in the next section using a multivariate
econometric framework.
3 Econometric Analysis of Low-Pay Transitions
To explore the extent to which the observed decline in the probability of escaping low
earnings reflects an increase in genuine state dependence, we characterize the determinants
of low-pay persistence and exit rates by explicitly distinguishing between observed and
unobserved heterogeneity and true state dependence.
3.1 Model specification
To analyze low-pay transitions for each year in our sample period, we estimate the prob-
ability of being low paid in period t, conditional on the lagged pay status in t − 5, with
t = 1989 − 2004. An endogeneity issue which is commonly referred to as the ’initial
conditions problem’ (Heckman 1981) arises if the starting point of the earnings process
cannot be observed in the data and the unobservables affecting this process are correlated.
A common solution is to specify an additional equation for the initial condition and to
allow for a correlation between the error terms of the initial conditions and the transition
equation. A second endogeneity issue arises since pay transitions are only observable for
employees who stay full-time employed five years later. If unobservables affecting the
probability of dropping out and the initial low-pay status are correlated, the resulting
earnings attrition will be endogenous to the pay transition process.10
In order to account for these selection mechanisms, we estimate a series of trivariate
probit models. Each model includes the determination of low-pay status in period t − 5
(to account for the initial conditions problem), the determination of whether full-time
10Descriptive evidence from Table B2 already suggests that the likelihood of earnings retention is larger
for high paid than for low paid workers.
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earnings are observed at both points in time, t− 5 and t (earnings retention), the deter-
mination of pay status in period t, and, finally, the correlation of unobservables affecting
these processes.11
We first specify the initial low-pay status. Let l∗it−5 denote a latent low-pay propen-
sity for individual i at the start of the observation period and xit−5 represents a set of
individual-specific characteristics. xit−5 includes seven different age groups, tenure, tenure
squared, a dummy indicating foreign nationality as well as dummies on educational at-
tainment (three categories) and occupational status to capture labor market experience
and human capital endowment. We also include information on the previous employment
history such as the employment status prior to entry into the current establishment, the
number of previous unemployment and non-employment spells as well as the cumulated
duration of previous unemployment and non-employment spells. We further control for
the sectoral affiliation as well as regional dummies. uit−5 is the sum of an individual-
specific effect, µi, and an orthogonal white-noise error, δit−5, and is assumed to follow a
standard normal distribution.
l∗it−5 = β
′xit−5 + uit−5, uit−5 ∼ N (0, 1) (1)
If l∗it−5 exceeds some unobservable value (normalized to zero), individual i is observed to
be low paid. We define a binary indicator Lit−5 = 1 if l∗it−5 > 0 and zero otherwise.
The next process to be specified is the earnings retention. We assume that the propen-
sity to observe full-time earnings of individual i in period t− 5 and t can be described by
a latent retention index r∗it,
r∗it = δ
′yit−5 + εit, εit ∼ N (0, 1) , (2)
11Due to computational constraints, we do not exploit the panel structure of our data as we estimate
the trivariate model separately for each of the 16 years of our observation period. However, as our main
focus is to analyze the evolution of GSD over time in general, the individual correlations over time as well
as the occurrence of lagged state dependence or feedback effects as investigated, e.g., by Biewen (2009)
and Wooldridge (2005) are beyond the scope of this paper and might be subject to further research.
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where the error term εit is standard normally distributed and specified as the sum of
an individual-specific effect, ηi, and an orthogonal white-noise error, ξit−5. yit−5 includes
factors affecting both earnings and the attachment to paid employment. yit−5 contains
xit−5, i.e. we assume that factors affecting earnings levels are generally also relevant in
determining earnings retention. In order to identify the equation, we need to exclude
one variable from xit−5 and add an additional one that affects the attachment to paid
employment which is not part of xit−5 (see below). If the latent retention propensity
of individual i is lower than some critical unobserved value (again normalized to zero),
earnings and low-pay status cannot be observed in period t. Let Rit be a binary variable
of the earnings retention outcome of each individual, where Rit = 1 if r
∗
it > 0 and zero
otherwise.
The third component of the model is the specification of the low-pay status in period
t. We assume that the latent propensity of low pay can be characterized by
l∗it = [(Lit−5) γ
′
1 + (1− Lit−5) γ′2] zit−5 + υit, υit ∼ N (0, 1) , (3)
with υit denoting the sum of an individual-specific effect, τi, and an orthogonal white-noise
error, ζit−5. The column vector zit−5 comprises individual-specific attributes affecting the
pay status in t. In order to deal with simultaneous changes in covariates and pay status,
the individual characteristics pertain to period t − 5. The switching specification in (3)
allows the impact of the explanatory variables to differ according to the low-pay status in
the initial period. Again, Lit denotes a binary variable Lit = 1 if l
∗
it > 0 and zero otherwise,
where Lit is only observable if Rit = 1. As a consequence, the sample likelihood will be
endogenously truncated.
We assume that the error terms in each of the three equations are jointly distributed
as trivariate normal with unrestricted correlations, which can be written as
ρ1 ≡ corr (uit−5, εit) (4)
ρ2 ≡ corr (uit−5, υit) (5)
ρ3 ≡ corr (vit, εit) . (6)
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The cross-equation correlations provide a parameterization of unobserved heterogeneity.
The correlation ρ1 describes the relationship between unobservable factors affecting the
initial low-pay status and earnings retention. A negative sign suggests that individuals
who were more likely to be low paid in the initial period are more likely to drop out of full-
time employment compared with high paid individuals. The correlation ρ2 summarizes the
association between unobservable factors determining the initial and the current low-pay
status. Here, a positive sign would imply that individuals earning low pay in t−5 are more
likely to remain in the low-pay status. The correlation ρ3 characterizes the relationship
between unobservables affecting the retention propensity and the current low-pay status.
A negative sign would indicate that individuals employed at both points in time are
more likely to escape low pay in t as compared to individuals dropping out of full-time
employment. Estimation of unconstrained cross-correlation coefficients provides a test of
whether initial conditions and the earnings retention process may be treated as exogenous.
In particular, ρ1 = ρ3 = 0 would imply that the earnings retention process is exogenous
and would give rise to a bivariate probit model. Similarly, testing the exogeneity of initial
conditions amounts to testing ρ1 = ρ2 = 0. Finally, if all cross-equation correlations
are zero, then γ1 and γ2 can be consistently estimated using univariate probit models on
subsamples depending on individuals’ initial pay status (Lit−5 = 0 or Lit−5 = 1).
Estimating the model with unrestricted cross-equation correlations requires identify-
ing restrictions, i.e. variables entering xit−5 and yit−5 but not zit−5. In other words, one
ideally needs variables that affect the initial condition and the retention probability but
not the transition process. In what follows, we will argue that variables proxying the sta-
bility of a worker’s employment history might satisfy these requirements. This is based
upon the notion that low-wage jobs may be the result of asymmetric information about
a worker’s true productivity, which is not known ex-ante and becomes known more pre-
cisely as a worker’s job tenure increases (Jovanovic 1979). In this case, the less regular
the employment history, the more difficult it becomes for an individual to signal high
productivity, which determines the initial wage. Once, however, an individual is observed
five years later in the sample, the employment history may be expected to lose importance
in determining an individual’s wage position. Thus, employment history variables may be
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suitable instruments as they are likely to affect the attachment to full-time employment
and the probability of being initially low paid, but not the low-pay transition. We will test
the validity of our exclusion restrictions imposed for identification using functional form
as the identifying restriction. As will be shown in Section 3.3.1., excluding the number of
previous employers until 1989 (the number of previous unemployment spells after 1989)
from the transition and retention equation as well as the number of employment interrup-
tions with the current employer from the transition and initial conditions equation fulfills
the requirements for the validity of these restrictions for the men’s model. For women, we
use the total unemployment duration as an identifying variable for the retention process
as well as the number of employment interruptions with the current employer for the
initial low-pay status and exclude these variables from the transition equation.12
3.2 Measures of State Dependence
To investigate the extent to which the decline in the probability of escaping low earnings
is caused by an increase in the persistence of low-wage employment, we distinguish be-
tween aggregate state dependence (ASD) and genuine state dependence (GSD). ASD
is obtained by computing the difference in average predicted transition probabilities for
those who were low paid in t− 5 and for those who were initially high paid:
ASD =
∑
i∈(Lit−5=1,Rit=1) Pr (Lit = 1|Lit−5 = 1)∑
i Lit−5 ·Rit
−
∑
i∈(Lit−5=0,Rit=1) Pr (Lit = 1|Lit−5 = 0)∑
i (1− Lit−5) ·Rit
=
∑
i∈(Lit−5=1,Rit=1)
Φ2(zit−5γ̂1,xit−5β̂;ρ2)
Φ(xit−5β̂)∑
i Lit−5 ·Rit
−
∑
i∈(Lit−5=0,Rit=1)
Φ2(zit−5γ̂2,−xit−5β̂;−ρ2)
Φ(−xit−5β̂)∑
i (1− Lit−5) ·Rit
, (7)
where Φ (·) and Φ2 (·) are cumulative density functions of the univariate and bivari-
ate standard normal distributions. This measure does not take into account individual
observed or unobserved heterogeneity.
12Although Jovanovic (1979) does not explicitly allow for recalls in his model, it is reasonable to assume
that the number of employment interruptions may worsen the precision of workers’ signals with respect
to their true productivity.
18
Genuine state dependence arises if initial low pay causes low-pay employment in the
future for reasons of stigmatization or human capital depreciation. The absence of GSD
can be directly tested by using the endogenous switching structure in (3) and amounts to
testing the null hypothesis H0 : γ1 = γ2. To account for individual-specific heterogeneity,
the GSD is based upon individual-specific probability differences. In particular, GSD is
derived by first predicting for each individual with earnings retention five years later two
transition probabilities, of which one will be counterfactual: i) the probability of staying
in the low-wage sector (conditional on being initially low paid) and ii) the probability of
entering the low-wage sector (conditional on being initially high paid). In a second step,
the individual differences of these predicted transition probabilities are averaged over the
sample of those with observed earnings in t and t− 5:
GSD =
1∑
i
Rit
∑
i∈Rit=1
[Pr (Lit = 1|Lit−5 = 1)− Pr (Lit = 1|Lit−5 = 0)] =
1∑
i
Rit
∑
i∈Rit=1
Φ2
(
zit−5γ̂1, xit−5β̂; ρ2
)
Φ
(
xit−5β̂
) − Φ2
(
zit−5γ̂2,−xit−5β̂;−ρ2
)
Φ
(
−xit−5β̂
)
 (8)
The log-likelihood contribution for each individual i with earnings information ob-
served in period t− 5 is:
log£i = Lit−5Rit log [Φ3 (giγ′1zit−5, hiδ
′yit−5, diβ′xit−5; gihiρ3, gidiρ2, hidiρ1)]
+ (1− Lit−5)Rit log [Φ3 (giγ′2zit−5, hiδ′yit−5, diβ′xit−5; gihiρ3, gidiρ2, hidiρ1)]
+ (1−Rit) log [Φ2 (hiδ′yit−5, diβ′xit−5;hidiρ1)] , (9)
where Φ3 is the cumulative density function of the trivariate standard normal distribu-
tion and gi ≡ 2Lit−1, hi ≡ 2Rit−1, di ≡ 2Lit−5−1. We compute the trivariate standard
normal distribution by applying the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simulator, yield-
ing a maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) estimator (see Cappellari and Jenkins 2003
and 2006).
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 Correlation structure and hypothesis tests
For each year, our estimation sample is based on those individuals for whom we observe
full-time earnings in our data set. That the trivariate probit model is necessary to derive
consistent estimates of our parameters of interest is confirmed for all years as the hypoth-
esis that ρ1 = ρ3 and ρ1 = ρ2 has to be clearly rejected at the 0.1 per cent significance
level for both men and women. This provides evidence of the endogeneity of the initial-
conditions process and the earnings retention process. The tests also show for men as well
as for women that the hypothesis γ1 = γ2 and, thus, the hypothesis of no genuine state
dependence must be rejected at the 0.1 per cent significance level in each of the 16 years
of our observation period.
The cross equation correlation structure is summarized in Table 1 for both male and
female workers. As expected, the correlation between unobservables affecting retention
and initial conditions is estimated to be negative, indicating that those who were initially
Table 1: Equation correlation structure
Year
Males Females
ρ1 ρ2 ρ3 ρ1 ρ2 ρ3
1984 -.223*** 0.008 0.272** -.157*** 0.607 0.213
1985 -.202*** 0.054 0.406*** -.131*** 0.082 0.477**
1986 -.176*** -.200 0.348*** -.132*** 0.285* 0.412**
1987 -.206*** -.183 0.140 -.115*** 0.200 0.409*
1988 -.207*** -.299 0.131 -.118*** 0.078 0.544***
1989 -.198*** -.046 0.298** -.113*** 0.114 0.459***
1990 -.199*** -.368* 0.199* -.117*** 0.227 0.436***
1991 -.210*** -.206 -.070 -.132*** 0.183 0.394**
1992 -.218*** -.261 0.009 -.132*** 0.148 -.194**
1993 -.240*** -.229 0.279 -.142*** -.902*** 0.003
1994 -.214*** -.061 -.205** -.145*** -.127 -.239***
1995 -.223*** 0.099 -.176** -.150*** 0.108 -.279***
1996 -.235*** -.351* -.297*** -.154*** -.103 -.048
1997 -.221*** -.098 -.171** -.150*** 0.053 -.146
1998 -.225*** -.356 -.056 -.144*** 0.176 -.209**
1999 -.234*** -.204 -.255*** -.160*** -.275 -.181
Note: ρ1: Correlation between initial conditions and retention;
ρ2: Correlation between initial conditions and low-pay transition;
ρ3: Correlation between retention and low-pay transition;
Significance levels: ***: p<0.01; **: p<0.05; *: p<0.1.
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low paid are less likely to be employed at both points in time. A significant correla-
tion between the initial condition and the transition equation cannot be found, neither
for male nor for female workers. This suggests that any bias due to the selection into
low-wage employment influences the transition process through its impact on employer
retention. Interestingly, the correlation between the retention and the transition equation
has changed over time for men as well as for women. In the first years of our observation
period, we observe a significantly positive relationship between unobservables affecting the
retention propensity and low-pay persistence. This indicates that individuals employed
at both points in time were less likely to escape low pay in t as compared to individuals
dropping out of full-time employment. In the mid 1990s, the sign switches for both sexes
and becomes significant in some years. Note that a potential explanation for this finding
may relate to the change in the age composition of the low-wage sector. Figures 6 and 7
reveal that the start of the deceleration in the decline in the young workers’ share roughly
coincides with the estimated switch in the correlation between retention and low-pay per-
sistence. Given that low-pay is more likely to reflect entry wages in the first half of our
observation period, this may help explain the positive association between unobservables
favoring low-pay persistence as well as employment stability. In the second half of our
observation period, in contrast, low-pay workers appear to be more negatively selected
upon unobservables fostering persistence as well as instable employment histories.
To be validly identified, the typical identifying conditions need to hold for each of
the trivariate models, i.e. the excluded variables should have a significant impact on
retention (the initial condition) but not on the low-pay transition. Thus, in our case the
conditions require the number of employment interruptions with the current employer to
significantly affect the men’s probability of staying in the sample in a given year but, at
the same time, to have no significant impact on the probability of staying in the low-wage
sector. As can be seen from Table 2, the two excluded variables have a significant impact
on the retention and the initial conditions equation for male workers in each of the 16
years. For women, we similarly observe a significant effect of the number of employment
interruptions with the current employer on the probability of initially earning a low wage
for all years. The effect of the total unemployment duration on the retention probability
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Table 2: Inclusion of instruments
Year
Males Females
Instr. 1 in Instr. 2 in Instr. 1 in Instr. 2 in
retention eq. init. cond. eq. retention eq. init. cond. eq.
1984 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.000
1985 0.004 0.000 0.059 0.000
1986 0.001 0.000 0.652 0.000
1987 0.003 0.000 0.463 0.000
1988 0.000 0.000 0.132 0.000
1989 0.000 0.000 0.460 0.000
1990 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000
1991 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.000
1992 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000
1993 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.000
1994 0.001 0.000 0.172 0.000
1995 0.006 0.000 0.382 0.000
1996 0.000 0.000 0.401 0.000
1997 0.001 0.000 0.369 0.000
1998 0.023 0.000 0.013 0.000
1999 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: All values are p-values. For men, instrument 1 denotes the number of employment
interruptions with the current employer; instrument 2 denotes the number of previous
employers until 1989; after 1989 instrument 2 refers to the number of previous unemployment
spells. For females, instrument 1 denotes the total unemployment duration; instrument 2
is the number of employment interruptions with the current employer.
is, however, only significant in 8 out of the 16 years.
An overview of the tests concerning the second condition - the insignificant impact
of the excluded variables in the transition equation - is given in Table 3 for both men
and women. While the first two columns show for each sex the significance tests for each
excluded variable separately, the third column displays the joint significance test of the
two excluded variables in the transition equation. We observe for male workers that the
number of previous employers (until 1989) and the number of previous unemployment
spells (since 1990) seem to be valid instruments for the initial conditions equation. With
the exception of 1987, the impact of these variables on the likelihood to stay in the
low-wage sector is insignificant at the 5 per cent level. The number of employment
interruptions also turns out to be a suitable exclusion restriction as the variable has
no significant impact in the transition equation in the majority of years. As a result, the
joint significance test accepts the hypothesis (at the 5 per cent significance level) of the
two variables having no impact in the transition equation in 12 out of 16 years.
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The tests of the insignificance of the excluded variables for women reveal that both
variables seem to provide valid exclusion restrictions for the majority of years. This
is shown by the joint significance test that accepts the hypothesis (at the 5 per cent
significance level) that the two variables have no impact in the transition equation for 11
out of 16 years. However, for both excluded variables there are some periods where the
requirements for a valid identification are not fully met. While the total unemployment
duration has a significant impact in the transition equation in the last three years of our
observation period (1997-1999), the number of employment interruptions with the current
employer affects the likelihood of staying in the low-wage sector significantly between 1987
and 1991. Since - as seen in Table 2 - the impact of this variable on the initial conditions
equation is at the same time not significant, a valid identification of the women’s model
might not be achieved for some years in the late 1980s, so that the results for these years
should be interpreted with caution. Taken together, however, the tests show that for
the majority of years, the trivariate probit models are well identified for both men and
women.
Table 3: Exclusion of instruments from the transition equation
Year
Males Females
Instr. 1 Instr. 2 Instr. 1+2 Instr. 1 Instr. 2 Instr. 1+2
1984 0.159 0.328 0.181 0.488 0.611 0.659
1985 0.026 0.316 0.092 0.838 0.724 0.908
1986 0.382 0.495 0.506 0.604 0.444 0.619
1987 0.024 0.021 0.001 0.994 0.008 0.047
1988 0.333 0.376 0.271 0.498 0.030 0.076
1989 0.008 0.388 0.013 0.715 0.001 0.004
1990 0.268 0.301 0.245 0.818 0.000 0.001
1991 0.042 0.156 0.031 0.702 0.001 0.004
1992 0.007 0.742 0.031 0.467 0.570 0.607
1993 0.388 0.435 0.432 0.849 0.256 0.565
1994 0.576 0.213 0.430 0.342 0.975 0.696
1995 0.071 0.314 0.103 0.301 0.244 0.251
1996 0.443 0.751 0.690 0.142 0.427 0.214
1997 0.069 0.312 0.119 0.027 0.603 0.077
1998 0.037 0.442 0.086 0.007 0.961 0.042
1999 0.898 0.252 0.562 0.074 0.189 0.063
Note: All values are p-values. For men, instrument 1 denotes the number of employment
interruptions with the current employer, instrument 2 denotes the number of previous
employers until 1989; after 1989 instrument 2 refers to the number of previous unemployment
spells. For women, instrument 1 denotes the total unemployment duration, instrument 2 is
the number of employment interruptions with the current employer.
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3.3.2 Regression results
After having clarified the conditions for identification, we summarize the estimation results
over all 16 years for male workers in Table 4 and for female workers in Table 5. The table
shows for all variables their impact on the retention probability (Rt), the initial conditions
(Lt−5), the likelihood of entering the low-wage sector conditional on being initially high
paid (Lt | Lt−5 = 0) and the likelihood of staying in the low-wage sector conditional on
being initially low paid (Lt | Lt−5 = 1). We summarize the estimation results for each
equation by two different indicators. To get an impression of each variable’s robustness
over time, the first column not only displays for each equation the direction of the sign,
which is most often observed over time, but also measures the frequency of the signs’
appearance of the estimated coefficients on a scale of one (+/−) to three (+ + +/−−−),
with + + +/ − −− representing a positive/negative effect in each of the 16 years. The
second column provides insights into each covariate’s consistency over time by summing
up the number of years in which the sign of the estimated coefficient switched.
The variables explain the dependent variables over time quite robustly as the estimated
coefficients do not change their sign over time for the majority of the covariates. If they
do so, they most likely change it only once, indicating a possible structural change in the
variables’ influence on the different processes. This result applies to men as well as to
women, although the estimation results for men seem to show a somewhat higher degree
of robustness in terms of both indicators.
Turning first to the earnings retention and the initial conditions process, a comparison
of the equations reveals that for male workers almost all covariates exhibit opposite signs
with respect to their impact on both processes (see Table 4). Characteristics that reflect
unstable employment records like longer un- and non-employment durations, a higher
number of non-employment spells as well as employment interruptions and a change of
the employer, favor the likelihood of being initially low paid and reduce the probability
of remaining full-time employed five years later. Also, being foreign makes it more likely
to be initially low paid and decreases the retention probability. For other variables, the
interpretation works just the other way around: not surprisingly, a higher tenure as well
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Table 4: Regression summary for men, 1984 - 1999
Variables Rt Lt−5 Lt|Lt−5 = 0 Lt|Lt−5 = 1
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Age 26 - 30 (ref.: age 20 - 25) +++ 1 0 −−− 0 −−− 0 +++ 0
Age 31 - 35 +++ 0 −−− 0 −−− 0 +++ 0
Age 36 - 40 ++ 1 −−− 0 −−− 0 +++ 0
Age 41 - 45 ++ 1 −−− 0 −−− 0 +++ 0
Age 46 - 50 −− 1 −−− 0 −− 2 +++ 0
Age 51 - 55 −−− 0 −−− 0 − 0 +++ 0
Tenure +++ 0 −−− 0 −−− 0 +++ 0
Tenure squared −−− 0 ++ 1 ++ 1 −− 3
Being foreign (=1) −−− 0 +++ 0 +++ 0 ++ 4
Medium-skilled (ref.: low-skilled) +++ 0 −−− 0 −−− 0 −−− 0
High-skilled +++ 0 −−− 0 −−− 0 −−− 0
Previously full-time empl. (=1) +++ 0 +++ 0 −−− 0 + 6
Total non-employment duration −−− 0 +++ 0 +++ 0 +++ 0
Total unemployment duration −−− 0 +++ 0 +++ 0 +++ 0
Number of non-empl. spells −−− 0 +++ 0 +++ 0 ++ 3
Employment interruption (=1) −−− 0 + 7 + 7 ++ 2
Change of employer (=1) −− 1 +++ 0 +++ 0 −− 4
Blue-collar worker (=1) +++ 0 +++ 0 +++ 0 +++ 0
Number of unemployment spells2 +++ 0 −−− 0 −−− 0 −−− 0
Number of previous employers3 −−− 0 −−− 0 +++ 0 + 3
Number of empl. interruptions +++ 0
1) Measure of direction robustness:
+ + +/−−−: Variable has a positive/negative impact in all 16 years.
++/−−: Variable has a positive/negative impact in 12 to 15 of the 16 years.
+/−: Variable has a positive/negative impact in 9 to 11 of the 16 years.
2) Coefficients for Rt and Lt|Lt−5 are only available for the years 1984-1989.
3) Coefficients for Rt and Lt|Lt−5 are only available for the years 1990-1999.
as a higher education reduce the probability of an initial low-wage status and increase
the retention probability. Only for blue-collar workers as well as for previous full-time
employed individuals, we observe that the signs of the two coefficients point into the same
direction. The retention probability as well as the probability of being initially low paid
is higher for blue-collar (than for white-collar) workers and for those individuals who were
previously full-time (rather than not full-time) employed. At first glance, the positive
association between a previous full-time employment status and the probability of being
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initially low paid appears to be somewhat counterintuitive. However, this result may
reflect the fact that males exhibiting non-standard employment relationships reflect a
particularly selected group in the labor market. Considering age, we observe that workers
below the age of 26 years face the highest risk of being low paid, whereas we see a U-
shaped pattern with respect to the retention probability. Young workers (20 - 25 years)
and older workers above 45 years face a lower retention probability than the middle-aged.
All in all, the signs of the variables vary little for female workers in comparison to men
(see Table 5). Exceptions are skill and occupational status. Other than for men, being
high-skilled (versus low-skilled) and being a blue-collar (versus a white-collar) worker
reduces the retention probability. The estimation results demonstrate that especially
females between 26 and 30 years have a lower probability of staying in the sample five
years later compared to young female workers below 26 years. This result might be
explained by the fact that women leave the labor market more frequently during that
period, for example due to maternity leave. With respect to the initial condition process,
a main difference between men and women concerns the previous employment status. In
line with what one would expect, a previous full-time employed position now decreases
the probability of being initially low paid.
Turning next to the transition equation, the coefficients of all covariates are allowed
to differ - in line with our switching regression specification - across those who were
initially low paid (Lt | Lt−5 = 1) and for those initially high paid (Lt | Lt−5 = 0). As
one might expect, for most variables the signs of the estimated coefficient point into the
same direction as in the initial conditions equation, particularly for those initially high
paid. With respect to age, however, we see deviations conditional on the initial low-pay
status for male as well as for female workers. Conditional on being initially high paid,
younger individuals up to an age of 35 years have a higher probability than those older
than 35 years to enter the low-wage sector five years later. In contrast, conditional on
being initially low paid, the group of the youngest workers exhibits the lowest probability
of sticking to a low-wage job. Thus, once earning a low wage, it is much more difficult
for older individuals to escape from it than for the younger ones. This result is valid for
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Table 5: Regression summary for women, 1984 - 1999
Variables Rt Lt−5 Lt|Lt−5 = 0 Lt|Lt−5 = 1
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Age 26 - 30 (ref.: age 20 - 25) −− 1) 1 −−− 0 ++ 4 +++ 0
Age 31 - 35 +++ 0 −− 2 + 3 +++ 0
Age 36 - 40 +++ 0 −− 4 −−− 0 +++ 0
Age 41 - 45 +++ 0 −−− 0 −− 2 +++ 0
Age 46 - 50 +++ 0 −− 2 −− 2 +++ 0
Age 51 - 55 − 2 − 2 −− 3 +++ 0
Tenure +++ 0 −−− 0 −− 2 +++ 0
Tenure squared −− 2 ++ 1 ++ 3 −−− 0
Being foreign (=1) −−− 0 — 0 −− 4 −− 2
Medium-skilled (ref. low-skilled) +++ 0 −−− 0 o 1 −− 2
High-skilled − 1 −−− 0 −−− 0 −−− 0
Previously full-time empl. (=1) +++ 0 −−− 0 −−− 0 − 4
Total non-employment duration −−− 0 +++ 0 +++ 0 +++ 0
Number of non-empl. spells −−− 0 +++ 0 ++ 2 − 6
Number of previous employers −−− 0 −−− 0 + 1 −− 5
Employment interruption (=1) −−− 0 +++ 0 ++ 4 ++ 1
Change of employer (=1) −− 3 +++ 0 ++ 2 + 4
Number of unemployment spells + 4 ++ 1 +++ 0 ++ 6
Blue-collar worker (=1) −−− 0 +++ 0 +++ 0 +++ 0
Total unemployment duration −− 2
Number of empl. interruptions −−− 0
1) Measure of direction robustness:
+ + +/−−−: Variable has a positive/negative impact in all 16 years.
++/−−: Variable has a positive/negative impact in 12 to 15 of the 16 years.
+/−: Variable has a positive/negative impact in 9 to 11 of the 16 years.
o: Variable has a positive and a negative impact in 8 of the 16 years.
both men and women and confirms the descriptive findings from Section 2.3.
To assess the quantitative meaning of a variable’s impact, it is necessary to derive
the marginal effects as is described in Appendix C. Table 6 exemplarily displays the
marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the low-pay transition probabilities for
male workers in 1999. In line with the switching regression specification, the effects are
reported separately for those who were initially low paid and for those initially high paid.
For the former group, the effects are to be interpreted in terms of persistence effects,
whereas for the latter group the marginal effects refer to the probability of entering low
pay. Marginal effects are to be interpreted as deviations from a reference person who has
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all dummies set to zero and is defined by setting the continuous covariates equal to their
sample median values.13
Table 6: Marginal effects for male workers in 1999
Lt|Lt−5 = 1 Lt|Lt−5 = 0
ME Std. error ME Std. error
Average prediction 0.476 0.022
Baseline 0.589 0.022
Tenure 0.000 0.572 -.000 3.476
Tenure squared -.000 0.001 0.000 0.004
Total non-employment duration 0.000 0.072 0.000 0.841
Total unemployment duration 0.000 0.092 0.000 5.608
Number of non-employment spells -.004 19.967 0.003 754.08
Number of previous employers 0.008 39.628 0.001 188.82
Age 26 - 30 0.063*** 0.000 -.009*** 0.000
Age 31 - 35 0.099*** 0.001 -.010*** 0.000
Age 36 - 40 0.121*** 0.001 -.011*** 0.002
Age 41 - 45 0.172*** 0.003 -.011*** 0.000
Age 46 - 50 0.185*** 0.003 -.008*** 0.002
Age 51 - 55 0.231*** 0.002 -.004 0.003
Being foreign 0.000 0.008 0.009 0.005
Medium-skilled -.049*** 0.009 -.008** 0.003
High-skilled -.140*** 0.011 -.021*** 0.001
Previously full-time employed 0.018*** 0.005 -.012** 0.004
Employment interruption (=1) 0.020*** 0.005 -.001 0.003
Change of employer (=1) 0.005 0.012 0.005 0.003
Blue-collar worker (=1) 0.012* 0.005 -.041* 0.016
N (Individuals) 14,549 175,771
Note: All specifications additionally include regional, sectoral, and occupational dummies.
Significance levels: ***: p<0.001; **: p<0.01; *: p<0.05.
The first two rows in Table 6 report the average transition probabilities - which rep-
resent the two components of the ASD derived in equation (7) - as well as the transition
probabilities for the reference individual - which are referred to as the baseline probabili-
ties. The baseline persistence probability of 0.589 is considerably larger than the average
transition probability, whereas no difference is observed for entry probabilities. The ME
estimates indicate that observable individual attributes significantly affect the probability
of both staying and becoming low paid. While a better education reduces the probabil-
13A reference individual is a German between the age of 20 to 25 years who has a vocational degree,
a white-collar occupation and has had no regular employment relationship and three previous employers
prior to entry into the current establishment. Moreover, the reference worker has a median tenure of
2,040 days, has been non-employed for 90 days and has not yet been unemployed.
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ity of both staying and becoming low paid, other variables have opposite effects on the
low-wage persistence and entry probabilities. The marginal effects confirm earlier results
from Table 4, which suggest that the likelihood of entering the low-wage sector is highest
for the youngest workers below 26 years, whereas the likelihood of remaining low paid is
the lowest for this subgroup. An individual who is between 41 and 45 years, for example,
has a persistence (entry) probability which is 17.2 (1.1) percentage points higher (lower)
than that of an individual aged between 20 and 25 years, ceteris paribus. The continuous
employment history variables like tenure and total unemployment duration do not have
any explanatory power.
Overall, the estimation results indicate that for both males and females age rather
than the employment history variables drive the persistence probability. For example,
whether an individual has a long or a short record of days in unemployment is not of
major importance once an individual earns a low wage. This suggests that the extent of
true state dependence is quite substantial.
3.3.3 The evolution of genuine state dependence (GSD)
After having estimated the transition equations, we next turn to the evolution of genuine
state dependence (GSD) as given by equation (8). In Figure 8, we plot the estimated
aggregate state dependence (ASD) and genuine state dependence (GSD) against time,
separately for men and women. The estimated ASD values are nearly equal to the de-
scriptive values that we showed earlier in Figure 3. Comparing the evolution of GSD and
ASD, Figure 8 demonstrates that both measures are characterized by a quite divergent
development. While the male ASD has steadily risen over time from 25 per cent in 1987
to 45 per cent in 2002, the GSD measure exhibits a stationary pattern by fluctuating at
a rate around 40 per cent over the whole observation period. Thus, once observable char-
acteristics are controlled for, our findings argue against an upward trend in genuine state
dependence for the overall male workforce. For women, in contrast, there seems to have
been a slight increase in GSD between 1990 and 1999 from 47 to 56 per cent. However,
the growth of GSD has been distinctly lower than that of ASD which rose from 46 to 65
per cent between 1987 and 2002. This result highlights the importance of accounting for
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changes in the composition of the low-wage relative to the high-wage labor work force and
makes clear that the omission of such changing trends might lead to wrong inferences.
Figure 8: Evolution of aggregate (ASD) and genuine state dependence (GSD)
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An important pattern that emerges from Figure 8 is that, especially for male workers,
the extent of GSD has been substantially higher than the ASD during the first part of the
observation period until 1991. This contrasts with earlier results from other studies (e.g.,
Cappellari and Jenkins 2004 and Cappellari 2007). Recall, however, that in our GSD
measure we contrast for each individual - given his or her observed characteristics - the
probability of entering the low-wage sector conditional on being initially high paid with
the respective probability conditional on being initially low paid. One would typically
expect that individuals working in the high-wage sector exhibit observed attributes that
shelter them from low-wage persistence, even evaluated at the counterfactual persistence
probability. However, our strong results with respect to the age structure’s impact on tran-
sition probabilities lead to the opposite pattern. As individuals from the high-wage sector
are on average four years older than those in the low-wage sector, their counterfactual
persistence probabilities are considerably higher than their respective entry probabilities.
This gives rise to a large GSD value, which even exceeds the (observed) ASD especially
in the first years of our observation period when the difference in the average age between
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low and high-wage earners was considerably larger than in later years.14
We next turn to the evolution of GSD separately for the low-wage and high-wage
sector. Figure 9 reveals that the level of GSD differed substantially across low and high
paid workers during the 1980s, especially for men. In other words, had a high paid male
worker earned a low wage, his probability of staying in the low-wage sector would have
been about 20 percentage points higher than for an actual low paid worker. During the
end of the 1980s, the GSD of high and low paid workers converged for both sexes mainly
because the GSD of low paid workers increased more sharply. Note that this reflects
the compositional shift of the low-wage relative to the high-wage sector that was already
established in Figure 8. Since 1992, the evolution of GSD among low paid women has
been very similar to that for high paid women, whereas male low paid workers in 1999
still faced a lower GSD level than their high paid counterparts.
Overall, Figure 9 demonstrates that there has actually been an increase in GSD for
male (as well as female) low paid workers. Thus, the evolution of GSD for the overall
male workforce as shown in Figure 8 masked substantial heterogeneity across low and high
paid workers, as the majority of male workers earns a wage above the low-wage threshold.
Comparing the evolution of GSD among low-wage workers with the evolution of ASD,
we see, however, that the increase in ASD cannot fully be accounted for by the increase
in GSD among the low paid. The GSD/ASD ratio decreases from 0.90 in 1984 to 0.78
in 1999 for male low paid workers while it ranges quite stationarily between 0.84 and 0.94
over the observation period for low paid women.
A closer look at the evolution of GSD reveals that the increase during the 1990s for
both high and low paid workers was preceded by a decline in the mid 1980s. We, thus,
observe some cyclical pattern which differs across men and women only at the end of
the observation period. One possible explanation for this pattern could relate to the
evolution of the unemployment rate as a proxy for business cycle effects. It is commonly
suggested in the literature that wages are procyclical, i.e wages grow more rapidly during
14While male (female) high-wage earners were on average 10 (5) years older than low-wage earners in
1984, this difference dropped to 4 (1) years in 2002.
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Figure 9: GSD by high and low paid individuals and ASD, men (upper part) and women
(lower part), 1984 - 1999
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economic expansions than during recessions (e.g. Devereux and Hart 2006, Shin and Shin
2008). As Robin (2011) points out, this wage procyclicality is stronger for low-wage (and
highest-wage) earners compared to median earners.15 Thus, the probability of ascending
from a low to a high paid job might be higher in times of low unemployment leading to a
positive correlation between the GSD of low-wage workers and the unemployment rate.
15The main explanation for his finding is that when productivity increases, low-wage workers may
credibly threaten to quit to unemployment as their reservation wage increases with aggregate productivity.
Thus, firms may be forced to renegotiate wages up.
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Figure 10: Evolution of GSD and the unemployment rate, 1984 - 1999
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Although we are not able to make any causal inferences on the relationship between
the extent of GSD and the unemployment rate, Figure 10 provides some support for the
similarity of the evolution of both factors. For both men and women, there is evidence
that the evolution of the unemployment rate in year t matches the evolution of low-wage
workers’ GSD (measuring the probability of sticking to the low-wage sector in t + 5).
The low paid women’s decrease in GSD from 49 to 45 per cent between 1984 and 1990
was accompanied by a decrease in the female unemployment rate, which fell from 8 to
6 per cent during the same period. After 1990, the unemployment rate as well as the
GSD of the low paid rose distinctly. The positive association between the GSD and the
unemployment rate is confirmed by a high correlation coefficient of 0.87, which is highly
significant (p=0.000). A positive relationship is also observed for men for whom the
correlation coefficient of 0.55 is significant at the 5 per cent level (p=0.026). The results
therefore indicate that a higher unemployment rate fosters an increase in the probability
of sticking to a low-wage job.
3.3.4 Decomposing the evolution of genuine state dependence
While the divergent development of ASD and GSD may be attributed to compositional
shifts of the low relative to the high-wage sector, it does not permit us to infer any conclu-
sions about the counterfactual evolution of GSD, had the low-wage workforce composition
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remained unchanged. Note that such a distinction is relevant as the evolution of GSD still
reflects both changes in the workforce composition as well as changes in the differential
impacts of the observed covariates on the transition probabilities. In order to disentangle
these effects, we employ decomposition techniques by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973)
adapted to our non-linear framework:
GSDt −GSDt-h = (GSDtt −GSDt-ht )︸ ︷︷ ︸
coefficients effect
+ (GSDt-ht −GSDt-ht-h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
characteristics effect
(10)
= (GSDtt −GSDtt-h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
characteristics effect
+ (GSDtt-h −GSDt-ht-h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
coefficients effect
, (11)
where t and t−h are two different points in time with t > t−h and GSDtt and GSDt-ht-h
estimated as described in equation (8). While the superscript marks the changes in
coefficients, the subscript reflects changes in characteristics. Due to the cyclical evolution
of GSD over time, we apply the decomposition for two different time periods (1984 to 1989
and 1990 to 1999). The decompositions (10) and (11) differ with respect to the chosen
counterfactual GSD. In equation (10), GSDt-ht denotes how the GSD would have evolved
in t−h (i.e. 1984 or 1990), had the composition of the workforce remained constant at its
level in t (i.e. 1989 or 1999). The term GSDtt-h in equation (11) instead uses predictions
for individuals in t (1984 or 1990) based on the coefficients in t− h (1989 or 1999). The
characteristics effect, thus, involves the part of the overall change between 1984 (1990)
and 1989 (1999) which can be attributed to changes in observed characteristics of the
individuals in the sample at given coefficients, whereas the coefficients effect captures the
part which is due to changes in the coefficients at given characteristics.
Table 7 reports the results of the decompositions for the low-wage sector for the two
time periods separately for men and women. Panel A shows the results for the base
year 1999 (1989) resulting from equation (10), Panel B for the base year 1990 (1984),
cp. equation (11). Turning first to the time period 1984-1989, the decomposition for
men in column (1) shows that the change in observables would have actually favored an
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even higher increase in GSD which has been overcompensated by the (negative) change
in the coefficients. This result is valid independent of the chosen base year. For female
workers, the change in coefficients was the driving force of the observed decline in GSD
between 1984 and 1989 although part of the observed decline in their GSD is accounted
for by the characteristics effect (column (3)). This result holds irrespective of the base
year chosen. During the 1990s, GSD rose for both low paid men and women (columns
(2) and (4)). Irrespective of the base year chosen, the decompositions give very similar
results across gender. While around 54 per cent of the increase in GSD can be attributed
to an unfavorable evolution of characteristics for both males and females with 1999 as
base year (Panel A), the base year 1990 yields a contribution of the characteristics effect
of 35 to 39 per cent (Panel B).
Table 7: Decomposition of the GSD over time for the low-wage workforce, by sex
Base year
Men Women
1984/1989 1990/1999 1984/1989 1990/1999
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A) 1989 / 1999
Change in GSD 0.4 9.5 -5.0 9.8
Coefficients effect -2.1 4.4 -4.4 4.5
Characteristics effect 2.5 5.1 -0.5 5.3
B) 1984 / 1990
Change in GSD 0.4 9.5 -5.0 9.8
Coefficients effect -1.5 6.2 -3.9 6.0
Characteristics effect 1.9 3.3 -1.0 3.8
Note: All values in percentage points.
To sum up, this section has shown that the extent of GSD slightly increased from
52 to 56 per cent for women, whereas it fluctuated quite stationarily around 40 per cent
over time for men over our observation period. Differentiating between low and high-wage
earners shows that especially the low-wage earners have experienced an increase in GSD
catching up with the level of high-wage earners at the end of the observation period.
The fluctuation of GSD over time - mainly a decrease at the end of the 1980s followed
by an increase in the early 1990s - matches for both men and women the evolution of
the unemployment rate. The decomposition of GSD over time into a characteristics and
a coefficients effect reveals for male workers that the change in GSD during the 1980s
can be mostly attributed to a compositional shift. For female workers, it is rather the
change in coefficients that accounts for the decrease in GSD. During the 1990s, the
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characteristics effect has become more important in determining GSD for both sexes
indicating a compositional shift towards more unfavorable characteristics among the low
paid.
4 Conclusions
The purpose of the present paper was to study how individual wage mobility in the low-
wage sector has changed over the last two decades of the twentieth century in western
Germany. Using a large administrative data set, we first document that the low-wage
sector has increased since the mid 1980s by around 14 per cent. The overall growth of
the low-wage sector was accompanied by a distinct rise in the probability of sticking to a
low-wage job for both men and women. However, the extent of persistence, as measured
by the extent of aggregate state dependence (ASD), varies greatly across different groups
of individuals. Younger workers below 26 years, for example, face a much smaller risk of
sticking to a low-wage job than the oldest age group (50-55 years). As the share of young
workers among the low paid has decreased to a much larger extent than the corresponding
fraction in the high-wage sector, this compositional shift might have contributed to the
observed rise in ASD over time.
In order to explore whether the observed decline in low-wage mobility is accounted
for by compositional shifts or by an increase in “true”low-wage persistence, our analysis
primarily seeks to infer conclusions about the evolution of “genuine”state dependence
(GSD). Genuine state dependence arises when low-wage employment today causes low-
wage employment in the future for reasons of stigmatization or human capital deprecia-
tion. We compute a measure of genuine state dependence by contrasting each individual’s
transition probability of staying in the low-wage sector conditional on being initially low
paid with the probability of entering the low-wage sector conditional on being initially
high paid. The GSD is then calculated by averaging these differences over the sample
of workers with earnings retention. Hence, to obtain such predicted probabilities, we
need to model low-pay transitions depending on a variety of low and high-wage workers’
observable characteristics. In order to address the initial conditions problem and the
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endogeneity of earnings attrition, we estimate a series of annual trivariate probit models
that account for the selection into low-wage employment and earnings retention.
Based upon the estimated transitions, our results show that between 1984 and 1999
male workers’ GSD - opposed to their increasing ASD - exhibits a quite stationary de-
velopment at a rate of about 40 per cent with some fluctuations over time. Concentrating
only on those individuals in the low-wage sector, an increase in GSD can be observed
which is, however, clearly less accentuated than the rise in ASD. For women, there seems
to have been a slight increase in GSD during the 1990s from 47 to 56 per cent, which
is observed for both high and low-wage earners. However, the increase is clearly less
pronounced than the rise in ASD. The observed fluctuation of GSD over time, mainly
a decline in the late 1980s followed by an increase in the early 1990s, mirrors the evolu-
tion of the unemployment rate and indicates that a higher unemployment rate fosters an
increase in the probability of sticking to a low-wage job for both men and women.
As the GSD reflects both changes in the workforce composition as well as changes in
the differential impacts of the observed covariates on the transition probabilities, we use
decomposition techniques to disentangle these effects for the low-wage workforce. The
decomposition of GSD over time into a characteristics and a coefficients effect reveals for
male workers that the change in GSD during the 1980s can be mostly attributed to a
change in characteristics. For female workers, it is rather the change in coefficients that
accounts for the decrease in GSD. During the 1990s, the change in characteristics has
become more important in determining GSD for both sexes.
What do these results tell us about the ongoing discussion of decreasing wage mobility
in the low-wage sector in Germany? Taken together, our analysis highlights the impor-
tance of accounting for possible compositional changes in the low-wage population. It
also makes clear that the omission of such changing trends might lead to wrong inferences
about the development of true low-wage persistence. In disentangling compositional shifts
from changes in price effects, our findings show that - contrary to common perceptions -
the decline in low-wage mobility cannot be fully explained by an increase in “true”state
dependence, but also by compositional changes. Depending on the base year chosen, we
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show that between 35 and 54 per cent of the increase in genuine state dependence during
the 1990s can be attributed to compositional shifts towards more unfavorable observable
characteristics among the low paid. Our results therefore lend strong support to the
notion that appropriate policy interventions should aim at working against such compo-
sitional shifts by, e.g., improving low-wage earners’ skills and intensifying older low paid
employees’ vocational training opportunities.
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Appendix A: Figures
Figure A1: Aggregate state dependence by tenure group, 1984 - 1999
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Figure A2: Mean share of low-wage earners by tenure group and sex, 1984 - 2002
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Figure A3: Aggregate state dependence by degree and sex, total population, 1984 - 1999
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Figure A4: Mean share of low-wage earners by degree and sex, 1984 - 2002
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Figure A5: Aggregate state dependence by nationality and sex, total population, 1984 -
1999
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Figure A6: Aggregate state dependence by occupation and sex, total population, 1984 -
1999
asd_collar.pdf
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Figure A7: Evolution of the composition of sex in the low- and high-wage sector, 1984 -
2002
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Figure A8: Evolution of the skill composition in the low- and high-wage sector, 1984 -
2002, women
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Figure A9: Evolution of the skill composition in the low- and high-wage sector, 1984 -
2002, men
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Figure A10: Evolution of the low- and high-wage sector by collar and sex, 1984 - 2002
complow_collar_hl.pdf
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 b
lu
e 
co
lla
r w
or
ke
rs
Year
low paid men
high paid men
low paid women
high paid women
47
Figure A11: Evolution of the low- and high-wage sector by nationality and sex, 1984 -
2002
complow_nation_hl.pdf
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
fo
re
ig
n 
w
or
ke
rs
Year
low paid men
low paid women
high paid men
high paid women
48
Appendix B: Tables
Table B1: Description of the variables used in the analysis
Variable Definition
Age Age (20-55 years) categorized in seven sub-groups
Tenure Sum of all previous days of employment at current employer
Tenure squared Square of sum of all previous days of employment
Nationality Dummy=0 if German
Medium-skilled1) Dummy=1 if completed vocational training but no university degree
High-skilled Dummy=1 if university degree
Previous occupation status Dummy=1 if previously employed, Dummy=0 if previously
un-/non- or part-time employed or in vocational training
Total unemployment duration2) Sum of all previous days of unemployment
Total non-employment duration Sum of all previous days of non-employment
Number of unemployment spells Sum of all previous unemployment spells
Number of non-employment spells Sum of all previous non-employment spells
Number of previous employers Sum of all previous employers
Previous employment interruption Dummy=1 if recall from current employer
Number of empl. interruptions Sum of all previous recalls at current employer
Change of employer Dummy=1 if employer or employment status changes
Profession Dummy=1 (=0) if blue-collar (white-collar) worker
6 occupation dummies Either agrarian, salary, sale, clerical, service or production worker
16 sector dummies Two-digit sectors (for categorization see Drews, 2008, pp. 67)
11 regional dummies The 10 Western German states plus West-Berlin (until 1990)
Low wage in t (1989-2004) Dummy=1 if gross daily wage in t <2/3 of the median wage3)
Low wage in t-5 (1984-1999) Dummy=1 if gross daily wage in t-5 <2/3 of the median wage
Retention in t Dummy=1 if full-time employment status is observed in t-5 and t
1) To improve the education variable, we use the imputation rules derived by Fitzenberger et al. (2006).
2) Following the procedure proposed by Lee and Wilke (2009), involuntary unemployment is defined
as comprising all continuous periods of transfer receipt. Gaps between periods of transfer receipt or
gaps between transfer receipt and a new employment spell may not exceed four weeks, otherwise these
periods are considered as non-employment spells (involving voluntary unemployment or an exit out
of the social security labor force). Similarly, gaps between periods of employment and transfer receipt
are treated as involuntary unemployment as long as the gap does not exceed six weeks, otherwise the
gap is treated as non-employment.
3) Due to the introduction of the Euro in 1999, all wages before 1999 are transformed from Deutschmark
into Euros at a rate of 1e = 1.95583 Deutschmark. Since the wage variable delivers unrealistic daily
wages at the lower end of the wage distribution, we exclude all observations with earnings of less than
16e per day (in prices of 1995).
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Table B2: Mean values of the characteristics used in the estimation, by wage sector
High wage Low wage
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Females 0.28 0.45 0.72 0.45
Age (in years) 37.50 9.58 33.81 10.48
Low-skilled 0.13 0.34 0.25 0.43
Medium-skilled 0.77 0.42 0.73 0.44
High-skilled 0.10 0.30 0.02 0.12
Tenure 2,797.02 2,200.56 1,571.11 1,646.39
Being foreign 0.08 0.28 0.12 0.33
Blue-collar worker 0.48 0.50 0.54 0.50
Previously full-time employed 0.42 0.49 0.23 0.42
Previous employment interruption (=1) 0.22 0.41 0.18 0.39
Number of empl. interruptions 0.31 0.96 0.29 1.05
Change of employer 0.10 0.30 0.21 0.41
Number of previous employers 3.11 2.59 3.44 3.11
Previous unemployment duration (in days) 101.62 258.33 163.42 351.63
Number of unemployment spells 0.65 1.56 0.86 1.66
Previous non-employment duration (in days) 368.38 808.71 727.03 1,297.24
Number of non-empl. spells 0.96 1.72 1.50 2.46
Retention after five years 0.78 0.42 0.56 0.50
Low paid five years ago 0.02 0.16 0.55 0.50
Observations 4,866,868 766,533
Table B3: Share of selected characteristics in per cent among the total low-wage popula-
tion
Males Females
1984 2002 1984 2002
Age 20-25 52 24 40 19
Age 51-55 5 8 7 11
Low-skilled 27 33 29 21
Medium-skilled 71 65 70 77
High-skilled 2 2 1 3
Being foreign 14 20 8 9
Blue-collar worker 77 82 47 41
Previously full-time employed 16 25 20 25
Observations 7,760 15,170 28,858 27,053
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Appendix C: Derivation of the marginal effect
In order to be able to interpret the estimation results, we report the marginal effects (ME)
showing the impact on the relevant probabilities of a change in the chosen covariate. For
a dummy variable, the ME is calculated as a change in the probability resulting from a
change in the indicators value from zero to one, holding all other covariates fixed at their
sample median values. ME for continuous variables are usually estimated by evaluating
the partial derivative, which is equal to the corresponding coefficient multiplied by an eval-
uation of the normal density function. However, the computation is not straightforward
here because the transition probabilities are conditional in nature (e.g. the probability of
low pay in t conditional of being low paid in t− 5). To clarify this point, the conditional
probabilities are given by:
eit ≡
[
Pr (Lit = 1|Lit−5 = 1)] = [Φ2
(
zit−5γ̂1, xit−5β̂; ρ2
)
Φ
(
xit−5β̂
)]
(12)
and
fit ≡
[
Pr (Lit = 1|Lit−5 = 0)] = Φ2
(
zit−5γ̂2,−xit−5β̂;−ρ2
)
Φ
(
−xit−5β̂
)]
(13)
As is evident from eqs. (12) and (13), a change in the value of a covariate may affect
both the numerator and denominator of the conditional probabilities. In order to deal
with this issue, we adopt the procedure suggested by Stewart and Swaffield (1999) (see
also Cappellari (2007) and Cappellari and Jenkins (2008)) by keeping the elements of
xit−5 fixed. To do so, we first predict the low-pay probability in t − 5 for all low paid
individuals and take the average over these values - denoted as q. By inserting w = Φ−1 (q)
into eq. (12), we obtain Φ2 (zit−5γ̂1, w; ρ2) /q. This expression is used to calculate ME as
deviations between the conditional probabilities for a reference person and hypothetical
probabilities induced by changing each covariate by an unit. For the reference person, we
set continuous covariates to the sample median values and dummy variables to zero. The
same procedure is applied to fit.
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